Cet article montre le développement au Canada d'un bloc de politiques néolibérales, en considérant cinq sites d'activisme dans le domaine des affaires: deux organisations dont les racines remontent aux années 1950, qui ont plus ou moins embrassé des projets néolibéraux dans les années 80; deux qui ont émergé dans les années 70; et une qui s'est formée en 1994. Notre investigation se concentre sur la façon dont ces groupes ont contribué à la consolidation d'une hégémonie néolibérale dans les politiques publiques canadiennes. A cette fin, nous présentons des études de cas qui mettent en comparaison ces cinq groupes (leurs trajectoires idéologiques et les places qu'ils occupent aujourd'hui au sein d'une écologie organisationnelle de formation de politiques néolibérales) et une analyse d'ensemble des places qu'ils ont prises dans le réseau des conseils d'administration communs à plusieurs compagnies, qui sont imbriqués les uns dans les autres. Nous examinons certaines implications politiques actuelles. This paper charts the development of a neoliberal policy bloc in Canada by considering five sites of business activism: two organizations with roots in the 1950s, which more or less embraced neoliberal projects in the 1980s; two that emerged in the 1970s; and one that was formed in 1994. Our investigation focuses on how these groups contributed to the consolidation of neoliberal hegemony in Canadian public policy. To that end, we present comparative case studies of the five groups (their ideological trajectories and their contemporary niches within an organizational ecology of neoliberal policy formation) and a network analysis of the positions they have taken up in the web of interlocking corporate directorates. Some political implications in the current era are discussed.
This paper charts the development of a neoliberal policy bloc in Canada by considering five sites of business activism: two organizations with roots in the 1950s, which more or less embraced neoliberal projects in the 1980s; two that emerged in the 1970s; and one that was formed in 1994. Our investigation focuses on how these groups contributed to the consolidation of neoliberal hegemony in Canadian public policy. To that end, we present comparative case studies of the five groups (their ideological trajectories and their contemporary niches within an organizational ecology of neoliberal policy formation) and a network analysis of the positions they have taken up in the web of interlocking corporate directorates. Some political implications in the current era are discussed.
POLICY GROUPS AS SITES FOR CONSTRUCTING NEOLIBERAL HEGEMONY F rom the mid-1970s through the mid-1990s, neoliberalism became a persuasive policy discourse in liberal democracies such as Canada. The Keynesian project of the postwar era -a framework that attempted "to unite the principle of continued private control of the investment and production processes of a capitalist economy with public demands for a change in the market-determined pattern of employment and income" (Wolfe 1984, p. 47 ) -was largely supplanted by a marketoriented approach to governing capitalism. The shift away from Keynesianism was rooted not only in the enhanced structural power that globalization and increased capital mobility gave to investors, but in a complex configuration of problems associated with the Keynesian paradigm, some of which (like the fiscal crisis of the state) became evident in the 1970s, others of which (like the rising wage bill relative to productivity) were recognized by the late 1980s. Proceeding from the premises of monetarist economic theory, neoliberalism introduced a sweeping series of measures to widen the scope of markets in social life. These included deregulation, privatization, regressive tax reforms, erosion and dismantling of social services, campaigns of state deficit-and debt-reduction, the opening of doors to foreign investment, and attacks on trade-union rights. 1 What the policies of neoliberalism have in common is a commitment to "the principle of corporate private property, and its defence and advancement" (Teeple 2000, p. 6 ) -a commitment whose rationality seems self-evident in a context of heightened international competition, not only among firms but among states seeking the new investments that power local economies.
Integral to the rise and consolidation of neoliberal hegemony were the emergence of new centres of classwide business activism and the retooling of established policy institutes along neoliberal lines. This study examines five Canadian policy groups on the neoliberal right. Our analysis is built around four concepts which converge on a view of neoliberalism as a political and cultural accomplishment: a hegemonic project, in Jessop's (1983) terminology. 2 In the first place, we view neoliberal policy groups as crucial organizations of organic intellectuals, "deputies" or members of the capitalist class entrusted with the activity of "organising the general system of relationships external to ... business itself" (Gramsci 1971, p. 6) . 3 In the Gramscian framework within which this study has been conceived, such intellectuals are "organic" in a double sense: they are "organizers" of an advanced capitalist way of life, and their intellectual work is functionally predicated on the dominance of capital in human affairs. 4 The agency of leading corporate capitalists in governing neoliberal policy groups is an important expression of the organic relationship between the business of capital accumulation and the politics of policy formation.
Second, policy groups can be characterized as sites for the construction of political discourses which circulate in the form of various texts, having influence not only in business and government circles but in news media and popular culture. Such discourses are bids for hegemony in that they present programs and strategies which define the "national interest" in a given policy domain. The key issue is how a neoliberal discursive field -an ensemble of producers and consumers of texts enunciating neoliberal perspectives (research reports, speeches, press releases, news stories, and the like) -has evolved over the past decades, providing cultural resources for political-economic transformation.
Third, constructing a new hegemony requires social organization, and neoliberal policy groups form a critical component of that apparatus, inhabiting a space in civil society with ties to big capital, state, and media. These groups need to be analyzed as embedded elements of a social network, within which neoliberal business activism has taken shape and form. Ties between the corporate world and the world of policy groups -and the direct participation of corporate directors in policy-group workenable a continuing conversation in which political frames can be aligned and adjusted, effecting a moving consensus between functioning capitalists and their organic intellectuals (Useem 1984; Domhoff 1998) . On this score, we analyze the network of neoliberal policy groups and large corporations, interlocked at the level of their governance boards, and consider the relative importance of the policy groups in knitting the corporate elite into a political-cultural community.
Lastly, the corporate-policy network as a whole can be considered in terms of its distinctive Consolidating a Neoliberal Policy Bloc in Canada, 1976 to 1996 CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY -ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES, VOL. XXVII, NO. 2 2001 organizational ecology: the interdependent varieties and specializations that characterize the entire field of policy groups, including new organizational forms that may result from innovation (Hunt and Aldrich 1998) . The key issue is how each group has come to occupy a distinct niche in an emergent organizational ecology. Compared with former times, the organizational ecology of neoliberalism has entailed a shift to business activism, in two respects. On the one hand, since the early 1970s a number of "advocacy think-tanks" has emerged, either through transformation of traditional policy groups or as newly-minted organizations.
Unlike traditional policy research institutions, advocacy think tanks are not driven by a desire to advance scholarly research. On the contrary, their primary motivation is to engage in policy advocacy. In short, they do not covet attention in the scholarly community, but are deeply committed to imposing their ideological agenda on the electorate (Abelson and Carberry 1998, p. 538 ).
On the other hand, 1976 saw the formation of the Business Council on National Issues, a crosssectoral peak organization for business activism, explicitly seeking to construct a policy consensus not simply for bankers or manufacturers, but for the entire haute bourgeoisie (see Dobbin 1998; Langille 1987) .
In Canada it is widely recognized that the turning point in consolidating neoliberalism was the successful adoption of North American free trade, a crucial development in deregulation. By creating a North American zone, the trade deals of 1989 and 1994 placed Canadian locations in competition with investment sites in the United States, unleashing (according to Jackson 1999) powerful forces to harmonize Canadian standards and programs downward to the lowest common denominator. In the process, the terrain of public policy shifted as marketoriented approaches to "rationalizing" social programs, taxation rates, and regulations gained credibility. The reality of free trade, in conjunction with energetic campaigns by new right forces such as the Reform Party of Canada, the National Citizens Coalition, and the Canadian Taxpayers Foundation, has coined neoliberalism into the political currency of the day, so that policy groups which had participated in the Keynesian consensus in the 1960s were by the 1990s exponents of the new liberalism.
THE FIVE POLICY GROUPS
Indeed, this discursive migration from Keynes to Hayek characterizes the first two of the five policy groups we have investigated. The Conference Board Of Canada dates to 1954, when the New York based Conference Board (formed in 1916) opened an office in Montreal to serve clients based in Canada (Lindquist 1998, p. 128) . In 1971 the Canadian operations were moved to Ottawa, and thereafter grew rapidly, providing research, conferencing, and information services to business clients in the areas of "organizational strategies and practices, emerging economic and social trends, and key public policy issues" (Conference Board of Canada 1999a, p.1). The Conference Board is now the largest thinktank in Canada, and unlike others it conducts research using its own in-house staff (Lindquist 1998a, pp. 131, 133) . Its mandate to develop and disseminate knowledge and information tends to distance it from specific policy recommendations (Conference Board of Canada 1999a, pp. i, ii) . Within the ecology of neoliberal policy work, the Conference Board's niche is to provide a nodal point for policy research, linking into academia, the state and corporate capital in many different ways, but without an explicit goal of either advocacy or consensus formation. More than any other group, the Conference Board is a think-tank, plain and simple.
The group has long focused on issues of "organizational effectiveness": "one of the most critical determinants of our nation's productivity" (Conference Board of Canada 1999a, p. i). However, whereas in the Keynesian era effective management strategies were a means of promoting profit in conjunction with full employment and buoyant aggregate demand, by the 1990s the broader context within which "organizational effectiveness" was promoted had led the Board to declare as its mission, "to help our members anticipate and respond to the increasingly changing global economy" (ibid., p. 1). Indeed, in the 1990s the concern with international competitiveness became a focal theme in Conference Board discourse, both in terms of productivity issues and the need for Canadians to adjust their expectations to new realities of global competitive pressures. Commenting on the 1999 report Performance and Potential, in which Canada's performance is compared with six countries across 40 socio-economic indicators, Board President James Nininger states that "regrettably, we find ourselves lacking.... The truth is that Canada is only in the middle of the pack, when we compare ourselves with our peers. We can, and must, do better" (Conference Board of Canada 1999b). The proffered solution is to improve productivity both in administration of social programs and in organizational management strategies, thereby boosting performance without triggering inflation. The report comes out strongly in support of the devolutionary Social Union framework -widely perceived by its critics as a threat to national standards and universal entitlements -as a way of increasing the efficiency of social programs and government accountability by "establishing performance indicators in social programming that will change how government administers taxpayers' money" (ibid., p. 2). In the area of organizational management, the development of a more "flexible" working population is seen as a way to decrease the unit labour costs that are damaging the ability of Canadian industry to compete internationally (Conference Board of Canada 1998, p. 6).
The Conference Board is not an advocacy thinktank; rather, there are two senses in which it now occupies a moderate niche within the neoliberal policy spectrum. First, the proliferate texts that issue from the Board offer a non-partisan and technocratic perspective on public issues, organized predominantly around discourses of public-choice political analysis and neoclassical economics: the ideological toolkit of neoliberalism. Second, a broader social agenda is reflected in Conference Board strategies for meeting the challenge of globalization with a more flexible and productive workforce. At the heart of the Board's prescription for the Canadian political economy is restructuring organizational, social, and economic policy to enhance the competitiveness and profitability of capital.
The C.D. Howe Institute (CDHI) is described on its Web page as an independent, non-profit economic and social policy research institution, with a mandate to provide balanced, well-reasoned, and comprehensible analysis of issues of national interest to governments, the media, and the Canadian public. Much of the CDHI's work is directed toward providing input to policymakers, recommending, "where appropriate, particular policy options that, in the Institute's view, best serve the national interest" (C.D. Howe Institute 1995, p. 2), and consisting of short-term policy analysis, carried out by a small in-house staff of economists, with contributions from external academics and business economists (Ernst 1992, p. 115) . In addition to the Annual Policy Review and the 10-15 policy studies published annually, the CDHI maintains standing committees of business leaders and professionals who organize and participate in conferences and speaking engagements (ibid., p. 116).
The CDHI's antecedent was the Private Planning Association of Canada (PPAC), founded in 1958 by Canadian members of the Canadian American Committee (CAC), a group of business and labour leaders from Canada and the US whose aim was to "seek out and reduce the basic causes of friction in U.S./ Canadian relations" (Ernst 1992, p. 117) . While the main goal was reduction of Canada-US trade barriers, policy statements from the 1960s demonstrate an acceptance of Keynesian macroeconomic policy and "a cautious stance toward Canada-U.S. free trade and the elimination of Canadian tariffs" (ibid., p. 118). Owing to a lack of resources, in 1973 the PPAC merged with the C.D. Howe Memorial Foundation, which provided a $2 million endowment, and the CDHI was formed. In keeping with the corporatist design of its predecessor, the board of the new group included not only a plethora of corporate directors, but also some of Canada's leading labour leaders such as Joe Morris, president of the Canadian Labour Congress.
However, since 1973, there has been a shift in the CDHI's policy stance that reflects the emergence of a vigorous business agenda in Canada. In the early-to-mid-1970s its policy recommendations took for granted the value of Keynesian demand management and programs such as Unemployment Insurance. By the time of its 1983 submission to the Macdonald Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, the CDHI had for the most part rejected Keynesian fiscal policies. Arguing that Keynesian measures for stimulating economic growth were no longer feasible in the face of global competition, CDHI discourse in the early 1980s began to emphasize that "the central goal of economic policy must be to encourage adjustment" (Dobson et al. 1983, p. 7) . The CDHI's complete shift from corporatist continentalism to neoliberalism is reflected in changes in its positions toward free trade with the US and Unemployment Insurance (UI). Election of the Mulroney Conservatives in 1984 "pushed the CDHI toward a harder neoconservative line" (Ernst 1992, p. 129) , and by 1985 it was embracing free trade as the only realistic option for Canadian economic policy. Lobbying efforts by staff, along with a major study (Lipsey and Smith 1985) were instrumental in convincing many senior federal ministers and bureaucrats to support a free-trade deal with the United States. In its 1986 policy review, deficit reduction superseded full employment as a core macroeconomic goal, and in the same year the CDHI reversed its earlier opposition to the Fraser Institute's plea to dismantle the unemployment insurance system (Ernst 1992, pp. 129-32) . Throughout the 1990s the CDHI continued to maintain a high profile, endorsing such measures as North American free trade, the privatization and decentralization of government services, the removal of universality from social programs, and the introduction of a "social union" framework to devolve authority to the provinces within a fiscal framework of reduced federal funding.
Analysis of two CDHI reports on social policy, from 1975 (Maxwell) and 1994 (Watson, Richards and Brown) , reveals the shift that took place. While the 1975 report explored the complex structural factors underlying such problems as unemployment and high inflation rates, the 1994 report portrayed social programs and government spending as root causes of Canada's economic problems, as economist William Watson asked, "is there anyone in this country who is not on the dole?" (Watson, Richards and Brown 1994, p. 15) . Many of the structural conditions and market forces that in the 1975 report were considered susceptible to regulation were treated in the 1994 report as beyond control of any national government. 5 The Conference Board and C.D. Howe Institute have taken similar routes into their current "mainstream" niches in the organizational ecology of neoliberal policy work. Both had roots in the era of Keynesian consensus, when they brought together business leaders, technical experts, and labour leaders around an agenda of cautious, continentalist corporatism, suited to the distinctively "permeable" fordism that prevailed at the time (Jenson 1989) . Although the Institute's shift to neoliberalism began as the postwar order unraveled in the mid-1970s, it was the question of US-Canada free trade in the 1980s that truly crystalized matters. By the late 1980s, the CDHI was trumpeting the benefits of deregulated markets, the virtues of the self-reliant individual and the dangers of the overweening, debtplagued state, while the Conference Board was reframing its strategies for organizational effectiveness along the lines of flexible labour relations and decentralized, targeted social programs: the leaner, neoliberal state. By the 1990s, the boards of these groups, which had earlier included labour representation, were describable as centres of corporate consensus formation, well suited to a neoliberal policy agenda.
The Business Council on National Issues (BCNI) occupies a unique position in this organizational ecology. Unlike the other groups in our study, the project of the Council is primarily one of consensusformation; it is less a "think-tank" than it is a shadow government -an executive committee of 150 top CEOs -for managing the common affairs of Canada's corporate elite. Beyond finding a single voice for enunciating the claims of corporate capital, the BCNI endeavors to make that voice carry into state practices and public discourse through lobbying the federal government and making high-profile forays into the public sphere. In contrast with the thinktanks, whose media work tends to wear a veneer of objective respectability in the popular imagination, the BCNI is transparently a creature of the corporate elite, and its persuasiveness in popular discourse depends on its effectiveness in constructing a general interest aligning the people with the needs of capital.
The BCNI was formed in 1976 to address concerns that the corporate elite had no organization that could represent its broad range of interests as a coherent hegemonic project. While Canadian corporations had long depended on state support, this relationship had deteriorated badly by the 1970s, and as corporations had come to be regarded as vehicles for a wealthy interest group their public image had declined (Dobbin 1998, p. 165) . Poor public image, a government that was often critical of the business community, labour unrest, and a changing international political economy provided the context in which two corporate leaders, Alfred Powis and W.O. Twaits, decided to form an organization whose purpose would be to boost the image and influence of corporate interests in Canada. Canadian corporations had up until this point been slow to respond to global economic developments, and were torn between protecting their short-term interests and collaborating with government to devise long-term economic strategies (Langille 1987, p. 48) .
The BCNI bears a strong resemblance to the Business Roundtable in the United States (ibid., pp. 49-50). Membership is by invitation, and consists of "150 chief executives of leading Canadian companies representing every sector of the economy" (BCNI Web page). The Council's mandate is "to ensure that Canadian chief executives play an influential role in the international financial, trade, investment, environmental and foreign affairs domains" (ibid.). Its structure consists of an executive committee and policy committee (providing overall direction), a secretariat (providing support and research services), and the general membership (serving on committees and task forces (d'Aquino 1991, p. 194) . BCNI task forces resemble "a virtual shadow cabinet -covering National Finance, International Economy and Trade, Taxation, Competition Policy, Energy Policy and Natural Resources, Federal-Provincial Relations, Social Policy and Retirement Income, Labour Relations and Manpower, Government Organization and Regulation, Foreign Policy and Defence, Education, and Corporate Governance" (Langille 1987, p. 55) . Taskforce findings and recommendations are forwarded to the executive committee, which carries "the Council's message to governments, to key opinion moulders, to specific constituencies, or to the public at large" (d'Aquino 1991, p. 195) .
Since the 1970s, the BCNI has advocated the reduction of a government presence in the economy and the opening up of Canada's borders to investment. The fiscal crisis of the state provided a pretext for its calls for restraint and deregulation, and in the late 1990s the challenge posed by alleviation of fiscal crisis was met with a rhetorical shift from the state deficit to global competition as the looming threat to national health. In 1999, the Council launched its Canada Global Leadership Initiative, to address concerns that Canada's position in the global economy will deteriorate rapidly unless action is taken to further reduce corporate and personal tax rates and restrain government spending. At its Summit 2000 meeting in April 2000, the BCNI issued a report envisaging a future in which Canadians and their enterprises maintain a coveted status as "world leaders" rather than "regional followers": attracting the big corporations, head offices, cutting-edge technology, and rich people whose ideas and money produce prosperity, and in the process pay most of the government's bills. Through lower corporate and personal income tax rates, the report claimed, "we must make Canada a compelling place for Canadians and foreigners alike to invest their money in our people and ideas, and to build growing global enterprises" (BCNI 2000, p. 15) . This example shows that the BCNI does not simply respond to government policy initiatives; it anticipates issues and delivers its recommendations to policymakers and the media while initiatives are under consideration (Langille 1987, p. 55) . As Dobbin notes, since the days of the Trudeau Liberals, governments and prime ministers have come and gone, but "the BCNI, the voice and organizational embodiment of corporate rule, is a permanent presence" (1998, p. 168).
Founded in 1974, the Fraser Institute (FI) has actively struggled to secure a hegemonic position for "free market" principles in the economic, political, and social domains of Canadian society. The Institute's formation dates from 1973, when founder and director Michael Walker, then working for the federal Finance Department managed to persuade T. Patrick Boyle, vice-president of MacMillan Bloedel, along with 15 mining executives to invest $200,000 in the FI's 1975 start-up (Scott 1994, p. 109) . Since that time, Institute revenues and membership have grown steadily, with the annual income rising from $825,736 in 1983 to $3,253,846 in 1997, and total membership (corporations, foundations, and individuals) increasing from 521 in 1983 to over 1,200 in 1997 (Fraser Institute 1983 1997, p. 25) . In addition to its headquarters in Vancouver, the Institute has an office in Toronto and a mailing address in Seattle, Washington (Scott 1994, p. 112) . Along with its recently formed east-coast cousin, the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, the Fraser Institute is the most advocacy-oriented of our five policy groups. Much as the BCNI has been modeled after its American sister organization, the FI is a close replica of American advocacy think-tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute. Funded privately by large corporations, the FI's sources and methods of fundraising resemble those of its American counterparts (Havemann 1986, p. 15 ).
Neoliberal advocacy is at the heart of the FI's project. Its Annual Report for 1997 describes its mandate as providing "an alternative to wellintentioned but misguided and conventional views about the appropriate role of government in the economy" (1997, p. 4) . Ideologically, the FI draws upon a combination of "neoclassical economics and libertarian rhetoric" (Havemann 1986, p. 15) as in the works of Milton Friedman and Frederich Hayek. FI discourse has consistently represented the market economy as a self-regulating organic entity, the natural processes of which are distorted by any form of government interference -whether rent control, unemployment insurance, environmental regulation, or medicare. The distorting effect of unemployment insurance on the mechanisms of the market economy has been a favoured topic since the mid-1970s, as the Institute has argued that UI creates a "disincentive to work" that actually causes high rates of unemployment (Grubel and Walker 1978) . The FI's operations consist of generating publications and holding conferences which are accessible to policymakers and the general public. Executive Director Michael Walker claims, "the work we do is global. Our books are distributed to 52 countries ... in August we are holding a meeting of economic advisors and analysts from 40 countries" (Brunet 1999, p. 5) . The Reform Party (relaunched in 2000 as the Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance) has drawn extensively on the FI for its policy positions and critiques of government policy. Despite the striking parallels between FI views and Reform Party platforms, and the winning of a Reform seat in Vancouver by Institute economist and Simon Fraser University professor Herbert Grubel, Michael Walker has denied any "overlap" between the Institute and the Reform Party (Lorinc 1994, p. 12) . While there may be no direct, formal link, the Reform Party has over the years proven to be a faithful consumer of FI ideas. Dobbin points out that "during the 1993-97 Parliament ... twenty-two of the fifty-one Reform MPs drew on Institute materials for their speeches" (1998, p. 194) .
These instances of political influence notwithstanding, the FI has had less immediate input into policy at the federal level than the more "mainstream" policy institutes. If, as Evert Lindquist (1990, p. 34) states, the policy-relevance of a thinktank's output can be assessed in terms of its "amenability" or "contestability" vis-à-vis the goals of its target audience, the FI's output has customarily had the quality of contestability. However, what the FI has lacked in direct influence has been more than counterbalanced by its success in "pushing the limits of acceptable political discourse well to the right, and in creating more space and legitimacy for neoliberalism" (Cameron 1997, p. 13) . The FI has made the greatest inroads into political discourse through the popular media, a forum in which the institute has moved from the fringe to the centre ... shifted from [being] a comic example of ultra-right hyperbole to the representation of reason.... No longer is its almost daily reference in the media prefaced with "right-wing thinktank"... the Fraser Institute is now as respectable as the Conference Board and the C.D. Howe Institute (Hackett and Zhao 1998, p. 157 ).
Hackett and Zhao state that "the news uncritically transmits the Institute's dubious assumptions, categorizations, and polemical language" (ibid., p. 157) and notes that a study of business news over the Canadian Press wire service found over a one-year period that "the Fraser Institute was quoted in 140 stories, while the left-wing Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives was quoted in 16" (ibid., p. 158).
While the FI has not had the direct policy input enjoyed by more mainstream groups, it has played a pivotal role in the dissemination of a neoliberal agenda through its media presence, publications, public conferences, and student programs. 6 Indeed, compared to other policy groups, the Fraser Institute has played an explicitly vanguard role in constructing neoliberal hegemony. Its full-blooded advocacy of the free market and minimal state, widely dismissed as no more than lunatic-fringe ranting in the 1970s, directly inspired the first coherent experiment in neoliberal state transformation, the Social Credit "restraint program" of 1983 in British Columbia; 7 its growing influence throughout the 1980s and 1990s in federal parties of the right -first the Mulroney Tories, more recently the Reform Party -helped place neoliberalism at the centre of political debate; its proactive strategy of co-opting a stable of academics into an expanding publication program while engaging in tactful "media penetration," has brought neoliberal ideology from the margins to the centre.
Finally, the most recent addition to the field of neoliberal policy groups is the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies (AIMS), an advocacy-style group formed in 1994 "as an independent, non-partisan, social and economic think-tank based in Halifax." "IMS's self-declared mission is "to broaden the debate about realistic options available to build our economy" (AIMS 1997/98, p. 1). In its ideological discourse, mandate, structure and modus operandi, AIMS is a much smaller, east-coast version of the Fraser Institute. Its 1998 board of directors was made up of 24 Atlantic-based members, two directors in Toronto (including its chair, Purdy Crawford, also chair of Imasco), and single directors in Montreal and Calgary. In its first years of activity, AIMS organized conferences, published books, and produced a monthly newsletter that became regularly cited in local media. Its pro-market interventions included a critique of regional development subsidies for Atlantic Canada and the advocacy of "market solutions" to problems in the fishery, in rural development, in environmental protection, and in higher education. AIMS also instigated a movement for "charter schools" which has since taken on grassroots appeal: an example of what its president has called "planting seeds" which take root and "continue to sprout and grow" throughout society (AIMS 1997/98, p. 7) .
Taking into account all five of the policy groups, it is clear that by the mid-1990s the neoliberal project had attained a firm organizational base in the policy-formation field. A collection of corporatefunded groups had been invented or re-tooled to accommodate the work of organic intellectuals committed to free-market ideology. The neoliberal formation had evolved into a complex organizational ecology, with niches ranging from the Conference Board's "pure think-tank" emphasis through the BCNI's consensus-formation project to the Fraser Institute's tenacious advocacy. This discursive field was densely articulated with both academia and the mass media, and encompassed a rich spectrum of authors and genres, from press releases and conferences to in-depth policy research, all sharing the common theme that in a globalizing world increased market discipline is required medicine for the nation's economic ills. We now turn to the third component of neoliberal hegemony distinguished earlier: the inter-organizational relations that knit the policy groups and many of the largest Canadian corporations into a social network, at the upper echelons of corporate governance and elite formation.
MAPPING THE CORPORATE-POLICY NETWORK
Since the pioneering work of Mills (1956) , sociologists have documented the social structures of elite integration in capitalist democracies in some detail. By examining the overlapping memberships of governance boards in the fields of corporate business, policy-formation and the state, "power structure analyses" have employed the techniques of social network analysis to map "the avenues of contact and channels of communication" between sections of the corporate elite that provide a structural base for business leadership in society (Clement 1986, p. 255) . The most studied case is the US, where Burris (1992) , Domhoff (1998) and Dreiling (2000) have researched the network of policy groups, tied through directorate interlocks to each other and to the largest corporations. In Canada, studies have focused more anecdotally on policy groups as elite fora with particular ties to corporate capital (Clement 1986; Dobbin 1998). In the 1980s, two networkanalytic investigations incidentally examined the corporate-policy network and found a substantial volume of interlocking between corporate and policy boards between 1946 and 1976 (Fox and Ornstein 1986, pp. 492-93) and between 1976 and 1986 (Carroll 1989) ; however, these studies did not attempt to trace the corporate-policy network in any detail.
Our intention here is to provide such an analysis at two points in time: 1976, when the neoliberal bloc was just forming, and two decades later. To conduct this longitudinal analysis, it was crucial that corporations and policy groups be selected into the study on a consistent basis over time. The task of constituting a sample of major corporations could follow standard conventions of research in this area. For the years 1976 and 1996, we simply followed the tradition of selecting the 50 largest financial institutions ranked by assets and the 200 largest nonfinancials, ranked by revenue, 8 and added to these a handful of key investment companies known to hold strategic blocs in the top 250 corporations (seven in 1976 and eight in 1996). However, defining the constituents of the neoliberal policy network posed more of a problem.
All five of our neoliberal policy groups have maintained strong ties to Canada's corporate elite, both in funding and in governance relations, but strictly speaking, in 1976 only the Fraser Institute qualified as an indelibly neoliberal organization. As we have seen, its ideological role in the context of that time was very much that of a vanguard of Thatcherism avant le lettre. Two of the groupsthe Conference Board and CDHI -had roots in the Keynesian welfare state formation of the 1950s and 1960s and only became neoliberalized later in the 1970s and in the 1980s. Even the BCNI's commitment to neoliberalism was rather syncretic in 1976, its formative year. As an emergent site of class-wide business activism, it was neoliberal more in practice than in theory. 9 For comparative purposes in our network analysis, we include all extant groups in both years, although only two of them -the Fraser Institute and BCNI -can actually be said to have been, in 1976, nodes of an incipient neoliberal policy network. As we have seen, development of that network has involved not only the neoliberalization of existing groups but the emergence of a new group in Atlantic Canada. In a substantive sense, it is clear that a neoliberal policy bloc, providing sites for such business activism from coast to coast, had been consolidated by the mid-1990s; below we explore its changing topography as a social network.
Like all networks involving the sharing of personnel across organizations, the corporate-policy network is constituted at two distinct levels -the organization and the individual. Key players at either level in this structure can have a major influence on the shape and form of the network; for example, in 1996, David Kerr, CEO of Noranda, sat on seven dominant corporate boards and on two policy boards (BCNI and CDHI) -generating a total of 21 direct intercorporate ties and 14 corporate-policy ties. In the same year, the BCNI, which is explicitly constituted as a roundtable of leading CEOs, included 100 directors of Canada's largest corporations, who as a group populated the boards of 120 dominant corporations, rendering the Council a sociometric star. 10 In Table 1 we can see that in 1976 a total of 241 people sat on one or more of the four extant policy boards; while in 1996, 262 people sat on one or more of five boards. In both years a majority of policygroup directors also directed one or more leading corporations, while 22 of them sat on multiple policy boards. The vast majority of these 22 were also corporate directors, and in 1996, six of them directed three policy groups each, forming a closely-knit network core. The many corporate affiliations of these individuals confirm that the governance of neoliberal policy groups is largely the work of the corporate elite while underlining the status of policygroup directors as predominantly organic intellectuals of the capitalist class's top stratum.
However, considering only those policy-group directors holding corporate directorships, Table 1 also indicates that there was a clear shift away from the practice of corporate interlocking. In 1976, 92 of these directors sat on multiple corporate boards; by 1996 only 65 were corporate interlockers. 11 The reasons for this have to do with changes in the political economy of corporate capital. In the era of organized capitalism, large corporations were integrated along a quite sturdy financial-industrial axis of capital relations and interlocking directorates (Lash and Urry 1987) . In the case of Canada, whose banking sector has been highly centralized, the boards of the big five banks comprised a "Who's Who" of the corporate elite: CEOs of major industrials typically served as directors of a bank, and bankers returned the favour, sitting on as many as a dozen corporate boards (Carroll 1986) . As Carroll has shown in related research, changes to corporate governance practices as of 1995 nearly brought an end to the long-standing practice of Canadian bankers sitting on the boards of major industrial clients and reduced the size of corporate boards, particularly those of the banks. 12 The exodus of bankers from the boards of non-financial corporations and the slimming of board size have meant an overall loosening of the intercorporate network and a reduced centrality for the banks, with ramifications for the corporate-policy network at both the level of individuals and organizations. Consider that in 1976 the Royal Bank was interlocked with 70 other corporations and shared ten directors with the BCNI. Two decades later, the same bank was interlocked with 44 other corporations (still, to be sure, a formidable number) and its board included six members of the BCNI.
In Table 2 we can see the impact of a sparser corporate network on the composition of the policy boards. In both years, the preponderance of directors of the BCNI, CDHI, and the Conference Board were affiliated with one or more leading corporations. Although by 1996 the BCNI had a bigger board, with about the same number of major corporate directors, fewer of these directors were themselves corporate linkers, although about the same number directed multiple policy groups. This pattern holds for other policy groups, except that the Fraser Institute's board grew as CDHI's decreased, with the latter showing a sharper fall in corporate directors on board but an increase in policy-group linkers. The tabulation also indicates that in both years, ties among policy groups were carried mainly by directors of the BCNI, CDHI, and the Conference Board. By 1996, over a third of CDHI and Conference Board directors were affiliated with at least one other neoliberal policy group.
We would suggest that the reduced numbers of corporate directors (and of corporate interlockers) on three of the five boards need to be interpreted in the context of a sparser network of corporate interlocks. The diminished prominence of bank boards as meeting points for the corporate elite may actually amplify the importance of, say, the BCNI as a site at which prominent CEOs may forge a policy consensus, and in the process reconfirm a consensus of values and world view. As Table 3 suggests, with the relative decline of bank centrality (last row), the BCNI's 120 direct ties in 1996 to major corporations are more integral to elite integration than were its 128 corporate ties in 1976. For CDHI and the Conference Board, the overall decrease in corporate interlocking appears to have had more impact: their boards have tended to include corporate "big linkers" who direct four or more large firms, but as the corporate network has become sparser the number of ties carried by such linkers has attenuated. Both CDHI and the Conference Board show sharp drops in their degree of interlocking with corporations. The Fraser Institute and AIMs -the advocacy think-tanks -are, in fact, the only groups that show gains in the number of corporations with which they share directors. For the Fraser Institute, this suggests increased centrality in the corporatepolicy network; for AIMs it means the establishment of a presence in the higher circles of the corporate elite.
According to one measure of centrality, which views networks as webs of communication, this is indeed the case. Anthonisse's rush index assesses the extent to which a point lies on the shortest paths between other points in the network, and, assuming that communication flows along the shortest paths, may be interpreted as the sum of the proportions of flows that pass through a given point, a measure of "betweenness." For instance, a rush of 0.2 would indicate that one-fifth of all communications in the network pass through that board. Table 4 shows rush scores for each policy group and for five major chartered banks. 13 The Fraser Institute moves from a quite peripheral rush score in 1976 to one not far below that of CDHI, whose rush score drops from second to ninth highest among the 260-odd organizations, mainly as a result of its having adopted a smaller board with fewer corporate linkers on it. AIMS's rush score and rank for 1996 resembles the Fraser Institute's for 1976, when as a recently- Canada, 1976 Canada, to 1996 formed group its board also had a more regional base. With the exception of CDHI, the rush scores for the policy groups increase, indicating that in the sparser network of 1996 they are increasingly starlike nodes that integrate the network, particularly the BCNI, whose score increases by 45 percent. In contrast, although the banks remain relatively central in the network, their rush scores tend to decrease, in the Royal Bank's case by over 50 percent, indicating a reduced proportion of overall communicative "flow" passing through their boards. Still, if the policy groups have gained centrality, bank boards remain important meeting points in the corporatepolicy network; indeed, in 1996 the five banks and five policy groups account for eight of the ten most central positions in the network of 258 corporations and five policy groups.
Consolidating a Neoliberal Policy Bloc in
An important part of any corporate-policy network is the set of ties among the policy groups. Already in 1976 there was substantial sharing of directors among the groups, mainly by virtue of the BCNI's omnibus board (see Table 5 ). In the ensuing two decades, despite overall decreases in corporate interlocking, the number of ties among the policy groups actually increased slightly, from 30 to 34, as BCNI maintained its interlocks with the other groups and established one tie to AIMS while CDHI increased its ties to three of the groups. However, the interlocks between the Fraser Institute and the Conference Board disappeared. These changes rendered the core of the policy network -BCNI, CDHI, and the Conference Board -more integrated, but also intriguingly split the hard-line Fraser Institute and the more soft-line Conference Board, with BCNI and CDHI jointly mediating between them by receiving directors from both.
As a final aspect of our network analysis, Figures 1 and 2 map the inner circle of the corporatepolicy network, constituted by the 22 individuals who in 1976 or 1996 directed two or more policy groups, 14 showing their organizational affiliations as lines, the corporations as rectangular nodes and the policy groups as diamond-shaped nodes. In these diagrams we can observe the roles that key organic intellectuals play in integrating the governance of corporations and neoliberal policy groups.
In 1976, we find the founders of the BCNI, Powis and Twaits, sitting not only on the BCNI but on the Conference Board and, in Twaits's case, on the board of CDHI. In the same year, Powis was president of Noranda Mines and a director of BC Forest Products, Gulf Canada, and Sun Life, and Twaits was a director of Alcan Aluminum, the Royal Bank of Canada, Abitibi Paper, Ford Canada, and Norcen. Other key organic intellectuals in the network were L. Lodge, president of IBM Canada, and James Black, president of the Molson Companies and director of Mutual Life -both of whom were affiliated with the BCNI, the Conference Board, and the Fraser Institute. Each of Canada's three largest banks -Royal Bank, Montreal, and CIBC -was a meeting point for several policy-group linkers, and fully 14 of the 22 linkers sat on bank boards.
By 1996, two banks -Royal Bank and TorontoDominion -were still meeting points, but overall the structural prominence of the banks had been reduced, 15 and non-banks such as Canadian Pacific Ltd., Sun Life, BCE, and Alcan, all meeting points for several policy-group linkers in 1976, no longer played this role. The decline in the integrative role of banks and other corporations renders the policy groups particularly central within the 1996 configuration: the BCNI, CDHI, and the Conference Board appear as a constellation of sociometric stars radiating ties through their directors to discrete sets of corporations. And although the Fraser Institute no longer shares directors with the Conference Board, its interlocks with CDHI have strengthened, 16 while the three most central policy groups -BCNI, CDHI, and the Conference Board -are knit together by four leading corporate capitalists, each sitting on all three boards and epitomizing the integrative role of organic intellectuals involved in organizing both the accumulation of capital and the administration of life beyond capital's immediate circuitry. 17 In short, we find at the heart of the corporate-policy network a tightly integrated inner circle. It is well to remember that our diagrams map 
CONCLUSION
Our starting point in this study was a four-fold conception of the role policy groups have played in the formation of a neoliberal hegemonic project. How, in terms of our four concepts, may we grasp this process as a cultural and structural transformation? Culturally, we have traced the emergence of a neoliberal discursive field in the various reports, books, press releases, conference documents, and other texts that issue from the policy groups and in the ongoing communicative practices -conferences, media strategies, consultation with state officials, and the like -which maintain a persuasive presence in civil society and the state. The groups have taken different routes to the present consensus, and the resulting discursive field is not homogeneous but variegated. In organizational terms, comparing 1996 with 1976 we find a developing division of labour among distinct policy groups that come to occupy particular niches in the organizational ecology of neoliberalism. The shift in liberal hegemony from Keynes to Hayek has occurred in some cases within ongoing organizations and in other cases with the emergence of new species of policy groups, as plain think-tanks have been joined by advocacy think-tanks and the consensus-forming BCNI. This organizational ecology yields a richer discursive field than would a monocultural or statist configuration: it offers possibilities for nuanced debate and diverse action repertoires, all within the perimeters of permissible neoliberal discourse. An important sign of successful hegemony is control of the agenda by delimiting the spectrum of feasible policies: the common-sense of state politics.
Much of the agency for neoliberal consolidation in the realm of our five groups has been supplied by corporate capital's organic intellectuals, a small subset of whom we have considered here. It is striking how extensive the direct participation of leading corporate capitalists has been in the governance of policy groups and how tightly-knit the inner circle of policy linkers is by 1996, but this participation is not itself an emergent aspect of neoliberal hegemony -it extends back to the Keynesian era. Moreover, it is well to keep in mind that the actual work of policy think-tanks is accomplished not by corporate capitalists but by their "delegates" -staff, academic associates, and the like -who likely share the same world view and have the requisite skill sets and time to execute technical functions. What is new about neoliberalism is not the representation of big business on policy boards per se but the heightened level of business activism in the field of public policy, both in the formation of advocacy think-tanks (financed and governed from their inception by corporate capitalists) and in the highly integrative BCNI, a kind of senate of corporate capital in which leading executives actively discharge an intellectual function in the political field, not as representatives of their particular business sectors, as in previous times, but as general representatives of the "business community."
Similarly, although the practice of directorate interlocking is not new, the consolidation of neoliberalism has brought some structural changes to the corporate-policy network. At a time when the intercorporate network has become sparser and bank boards less integrative as meeting points for the corporate elite, we find an expanding neoliberal corporate-policy network, in terms of both organizational and individual participants. The increasing structural importance of these policy groups in the life of the corporate elite is worth pondering in view of the tendency toward more internationalized accumulation. In a globalizing capitalism where mobile financial capital has gained importance, rendering capital relations more fleeting and sparser, nationally-oriented policy groups may gain importance as places where common visions and strategies can be forged. Although the policy groups we have analyzed co-exist with their transnational cousinsthe Trilateral Commission, World Economic Forum, Bilderberg Conference, etc., in which some of Canada's leading corporate capitalists participate -effective business leadership may require that the transnational viewpoint be counterbalanced by a continuing commitment to national politics. Indeed, in a globalizing era, it may become more not less important for the corporate elite to shape politics in the national arena, to lead in the construction of a collective identity that blends national pride with a disciplined cosmopolitanism of free trade, as we have seen in the recent BCNI Canada Global Leadership Initiative.
Finally, and as another marker of neoliberal consolidation, it is worth commenting on the position of the Fraser Institute. Consigned to the margins of political discourse and of the corporate-policy network in 1976, the FI has become more interlocked with large corporations, more centrally positioned as a meeting point for corporate directors, and more interlocked with the board of the CDHI, a "centrist" group whose policy framework had by the 1990s come closer to that of the FI. Without moderating its perspectives to any great extent, the FI has moved from the periphery more to the centre, as "market solutions" have become political common sense and as the neoliberal bloc has become more integrated.
What is missing from this organizational ecology, from this corporate-policy network, from the discursive field of neoliberalism in Canadian politics, is capital's antithesis. As analysts like Robert Cox (1987) have pointed out, the new hegemony is thin on the ground and relatively exclusivist. In contrast to the postwar class compromise, when corporatist groups such as the Conference Board and CDHI co-opted labour leaders onto their boards, the neoliberal bloc contains what network analysts call a "structural hole" where organized labour used to be. Not surprisingly, the very consolidation of a neoliberal policy network has provoked the formation of a counter-network around labour and its allies. In consequence, the arena of policy groups in Canada is now largely split along left-right lines, as corporate-funded groups jostle with such alternative organizations as the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, the Parkland Institute, and the National Anti-Poverty Organization, in a struggle to frame issues and to organize political practice. 19 But that is a topic for another investigation.
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3 It should be emphasized that Gramsci did not view the bourgeoisie and its organic intellectuals as mutually exclusive categories but recognized a considerable confluence: "If not all entrepreneurs, at least an elite amongst them must have the capacity to be an organizer of society in general, including all its complex organisms of services, right up to the state organism, because of the need to create the conditions most favourable to the expansion of their own class; or at least they must possess the capacity to choose the deputies (specialised employees) to which to entrust this activity" (1971, pp. 5-6) . The present investigation of overlaps between the governance of large corporations and neoliberal policy groups directly addresses the question of the extent to which corporate capitalists play a direct role as organic intellectuals in neoliberal policy formation. 4 See Giuseppe Vacca's discussion where he argues that "the organic nature ... of the bourgeoisie's intellectuals of a new type stems first of all from the technical aspects of the fundamental productive functions of the modern bourgeoisie. A further function is to help to elaborate and build consensus around a bourgeois model of society.… The organic nature of the link is inherent in the very formation of their specialized skills, as well as in the development of the particular functions of organizing the masses and the economy" (1982, pp. 62-63) . 5 As CDHI policy analyst David Brown states in the 1994 report: "the structural changes Canada is undergoing are so fundamental as to require that the social contract be rewritten … the old social contract has been rendered obsolete by global events beyond the control of any national government" (Watson, Richards and Brown 1994, pp. 116, 122) . 6 Since their introduction in 1988, Fraser Institute Student programs have expanded to include Student Seminars on Public Policy Issues, Student Leaders' Colloquia, the Canadian Student Review quarterly newsletter, an internship program, and the provision of student bursaries. Particular attention is paid to "the development of the student program as the Institute and its supporters recognize the importance of encouraging the study of competitive markets among students and young people" (Fraser Institute 1998). 7 In the early 1980s, the Social Credit government of British Columbia not only "approached" the Fraser Institute for ideas, but inserted some of these ideas directly into government policy (Havemann 1986, pp. 19-22) . FI recommendations to the BC government provided a focus and an intensity to a right market agenda in Canada which up until that point had "seemed unclear, divided, and less populist than its British or American counterparts and, therefore, unlikely to capture the overt platform of any major political party" (ibid., p. 13). 8 The major comparative study of corporate interlocking to date (Stokman et al. 1985) employed these criteria in constructing the top 250 firms for ten advanced capitalist countries. Ornstein (1989) 12 In response to worries about corporate performance and solvency in the wake of the collapse of Confederation Life, the Toronto Stock Exchange adopted corporate governance guidelines which advised members to compose their boards around major shareholding interests and truly "unrelated directors," rules which exclude major creditors. As a result, although bank boards continue to be meeting places for the executives of major non-financial firms, by 1996 the practice of bankers directing nonfinancial companies had all but disappeared. The same set of reforms called for smaller, more active corporate boards, thus discouraging the practice of holding directorships in more than a few companies at any time. These changes brought a general reduction in the extent of corporate interlocking, but had a particularly great impact on the boards of the big five banks, whose mean size fell from 46 in 1976 to 29 in 1996 (Carroll 2001) . 13 Line multiplicity (i.e., two or more shared directors between a pair of boards) is taken into account in these calculations. Only paths of lengths three or less (i.e., situations in which a pair of organizations is linked at no more than two removes) are included in the analysis. See Stokman et al. (1985, pp. 31-32) for a description of the rush index.
14 The concept of an inner circle of the corporate elite was developed extensively in the 1980s by Michael Useem (1984) , who argued that the embeddedness of such corporate capitalists -their common participation on multiple corporate and policy directorates -leads them to embrace a "class-wide rationality" (Dreiling 2000, p. 29 ). Dreiling's own study of American corporate political action in support of NAFTA illustrates the facilitative role played by the "policy formation network" of large corporations and policy groups. 15 In 1996, a total of six policy-group linkers directed these two banks, while two other members of the policygroup network directed foreign-controlled banks which had established a presence in Canada: the Dutchcontrolled ABN and the British-controlled Hong Kong Savings Bank. It is also worth noting that by 1996, key bankers played less of a role in the network. For instance, while in 1976 the chair of the Royal Bank, W. Earle McLaughlin, was affiliated with the Conference Board, the BCNI, and seven leading corporations, in 1996 the chair of the Royal Bank, J. Cleghorn, was affiliated with the same two policy groups but directed only two corporations. 16 The interlocks are carried by Brian Levitt, president of Imasco Limited, Roger Phillips, president of IPSCO Inc., and P.J. Hill, chair of Crown Life.
17 Namely Paul Gagne, president of Avenor Inc., William Dalton, president of the Hong Kong Bank of Canada, Diane McGarry, president of Xerox Canada, and Robert Peterson, president of Imperial Oil Limited. 18 As an example of one of the 240 policy-group directors not shown in Figure 2 , consider the integrative role played by Purdy Crawford. Chair in 1996 of Imasco and CT Financial and director of Avenor, Dominion Textile, Inco, Maple Leaf Foods, the CNR, and Petro-Canada, Crawford was in the same year chair of AIMS (a position he had held since AIMS's founding) as well as chair of a major policy group affiliated with the Conference Board (the National Council on Education) and a governor of McGill University. In focusing only on five policy groups, we have excluded many of the ties that integrate the corporate elite and extend its world view within specific policy domains such as education. For an analysis of the network of governance relations among Canadian corporations, universities and third-party higher-education organizations that parallels the present study, see Carroll and Beaton (2000) .
